John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Book III. Chapters 1-3 (7):

Reconstruction of Key Concepts and Few Concluding Remarks

One of the fundamental traits of what makes a human is certainly the ability to name and express thoughts and ideas, and consequently the production of meaningful articulated sounds, making thus possible the realization of the ability to speak and communicate. This attribute is the essential feature that distinguishes humans from the rest of existing living species on earth – the ability to define and signify meaning.John Locke gives an authentic view on the causal emergence and character of words, the signification of ideas, general terms, and how humanity utilizes the ability to produce meaning in creating a language. These mechanisms are used in order to give place to the process of communication and exchange of internal thoughts and ideas, to serve as a communication medium, and at the same time help with the inner creative processes.

This paper will attempt to summarize the main ideas of John Locke’s theory on Words, Language, and General terms as portrayed in the first three chapters of the “Third Book” in his publication An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.Additionally, it will provide responsive remarks and a few comparative propositions on his observations, the usage of terms and meaning making out of them, accentuating on their evolution and adaptation.

By turning his contemplative gaze to the use and purpose of words – and subsequently to language as a byproduct – Locke begins with the initial proposal for humankind’s innate attribute and ability to produce articulated sounds, ascribing them to the human nature or as God’s gift to humanity. This fact assumes a given reality and one that not necessarily relies on humanity’s choice or will, but rather functions as an established and fixed technicality (Locke III.1.1). Nevertheless, acknowledging that these mechanical factors, solely, are insufficient and not able to produce the necessary outcome for the purpose of communication and making ones ideas known – to oneself as well as to the outside world– he further points to the need of using these articulated sounds as signs of internal conceptions. These signs stand, primary, to identify the ideas in one’s own mind, and would subsequently serve as a referential point for the possibility of communicating and auditing them to the outside world, thus building the ground for exchange of thoughts and expression of ideas from one mind to the other – by making them signs of ideas. (III.1.2)

From this initial construction, as a next step in the evolution and realization of this potential, he notes the obstacle in the possibility of having separate names posing as signs for every distinctive idea, particularity or object separately. As a solution, Locke points to the categorization phenomenon of what he conceptualizes as general terms, in which single words stand as general signs used for the signification of multiple particularities or a multitude of particular things. This categorization covers the ability of articulated sounds of names/words to become general when used to standfor general ideas, and remain particular for the purpose of signifying particular ones. (III.1.3) In addition, he takes note on the abstract words humanity uses to signify the absence of ideas and meanings, such as the words he suggests: nihil (= ‘nothing’) in Latin, or those in English, such as ‘ignorance’ or ‘barrenness’. These terms relate to positive ideas, but do so by indicating their absence instead (III.1.4).

Further on, Locke examines the ‘names’ of abstract ideas that humankind uses to signify things for which we do not possess a sensed experience, and suggests that the origin and meanings of these type of words/names are extracted or developed out of the ideas able to be sensibly perceived. For instance, the terms that we could define as belonging to the abstract and psycho-emotional sphere of sensitivity, such as ‘imagine’, ‘apprehend’, ‘comprehend’, ‘conceive‘, etc. appear to be words that derive from things we can sensibly perceive and are applied to particular ways of thinking or feeling (III.1.5).

In order to better understand their use and relation in constructing the language, he further proposes to look upon words from two aspects: (1) considering what their immediate application is and (2) by decomposing their substance in sorts and kinds (or, as suggested in Latin, species and genera) – that is by what they consist in and their formation. By addressing these problematics, Locke suggests that humanity would improve in the collection and usage of words, as well as easily spot defects of language and improve the clarity in communication and in using proper words for signification of ideas (III.1.6).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

As earlier noted, to execute and fulfill the need to communicate ideas, the exchange of articulated sounds appears to be of primary importance in signifying them. In addition to this, Locke suggests that the linkage between a certain sound and the meaning it holds is not necessarily innate, but rather people arbitrarily chose to use words in marking specific ideas, and as such, the utilization of words is tied to the chief end of the ability to signify ideas. He accentuates this thought by remarking that if the sound and meaning had a natural connection, “there would be only one language amongst all humans”. In a more careful examination to the term of arbitrariness, we notice that the meaning had a specific connotation for the time it was used by Locke, and apparently suggests a decision, rather than random accidental choice. (III.2.1)

Constructing his theory, Locke observes thatwords stand for signifying the ideas, primarily, in the mind of the one that uses them, and later as a means of communicating them to the others. While communicating, one is expressing his ideas to the hearer with the hope of being understood, by deciding on specific words, which are meant to stand for and make up voluntary signs about things one has knowledge about. In addition, in order to make any use of words and to be able to use them as signs of qualities in things, or ideas in other’s mind, one must have certain conceptions about them in his own mind to begin with. Otherwise, they would make no sense, but rather come out as insignificant utterings. In the exchange of ideas, although parties consent on giving same names to certain ideas, the signification retains the subjectivity and remains personal – individual (III.2.2).

As the communication takes place between different kinds of people – of different social backgrounds – and it serves as a base for understanding one another, even though the internal conceptions remain different, the importance of having common general understanding for names of a certain type of things and ideas is crucial to language and to the success of communication. Here we note the individual interpretation of general terms, based on a personal experience with their encounter, as for instance the suggested diverse conceptions on the term “gold” in different persons, applying the same general term to their personal idea and the experience they have in encountering it. (III.2.3)

Locke further suggests that although the used words signify nothing but the ideas in the mind of the one who uses them, they contain – what he calls – a “secret reference” to two other things: (1) the supposition that their words bear the same signification in the minds of people they are communicating with and that they are being understood (III.2.4); and (2) the supposition that the words they use, signify not only their ideas but they also apply to the ‘reality of things’. This observation could be interpreted as a claim that the used words represent something more than only conceptions in one’s mind and that their signification is based on factual realities(III.2.5). Additionally, two other crucial points on the function of words are proposed: (1) because of their habitual usage for signification of certain ideas, the words – and the sounds used to interpret them – instantly excite upon the hearer specific impressions as if they were evidently perceptive objects (III.2.6); and second, (2) acknowledging the fact that humans use words, before the knowledge about their signification is fully conceptualized in their mind – the usage comes before the meaning is consciously denoted (III.2.7). Nevertheless, Locke appears to be strict in his conclusion that no matter the purpose of their usage – be that for communication or for inner cognitive conceptions – the signification of words remains personal and limited to the ability to portray, solely, the conceptualization of one’s mind. (III.2.8)

The outcome that the majority of words are general terms instead of particular ones, according to Locke, is the reasonable product of utilizing the sound articulation – and speech as its subsequent product – as a communicative and thought processing tool (III.3.1). Moreover, according to him, this occurs because (1) it is impossible to make use of particular terms for every sensible thing, and also, it would further result in extra charging of the brain with unbearable set of extensive information (III.3.2). On the other hand, (2) it would be of no use if all the terms for particularities are unable to be understood – by being too many it would be impossible for everyone to remember all of them – and will not help the communication of internal ideas as the end goal of language. In addition, by having particular terms for every specific thing in one’s mind, it would be impossible to communicate them through or have an agreeable set of signs for communication purposes (III.3.3). (3) But even if this would be achievable, Locke argues that it will not improve the process of attaining knowledge, suggesting that although knowledge is based on particularities, it is, however, successfully utilized by grouping them in sorts and generalizations, and these sorts are used only when needed and never beyond what is containable. In this sense, individual names are chosen according to the need and usefulness in mentioning them (III.3.4). Therefore, proper names are often given for the purpose of signification of particularities that are of general importance, as is the case with names of cities, rivers, mountains, etc. or of crucial importance to a certain group, as are the individual horse names to jockeys. (III.3.5)

The way in which words become general ideas is by taking the particularity out of them and making them signification of generalities instead, or general terms, as Locke puts it. As such, the general term stands as an abstraction and is able to represent more than one individuality, which conforms to that specific abstraction and is of that sort. However, it keeps its double character and the ability to act in each role separately: Sun and banana both resemble gold color; and “the gold is different kind of metal from bronze” (III.3.6).

Locke estimates that the conceptualization of initial ideas begins by signifying them as peculiarities only to be further broadened into general terms as they come to new understandings later in life. He uses the evolution in perception of terms in the child, including the analogy of terms a child encounters and the way they later develop into general terms by finding certain commonalities between all particularities. This evolution of ideas happens by stepping aside the specific/unique marks of each particularity and focusing on grouping them based on their common nature. He takes the example of infant’s understanding of the words ‘Mama’ and ‘Nurse’, and how they initially form different ideas in his perception, but later on in life he is able to signify with them the idea of commonality by identifying them both as being human. (III.3.7)

It is generally difficult to properly observe and consider works that belong to a remote and different era from the present one, considering the evolution in meaning of words. When encountering different terms, we notice a different connotation in some of the used terminology, which appears to be used in a specific way, making it a challenge to draw the closer to the right conclusions. However, it is worth the attempt to reinterpret the main ideas and conceptions of what could be extracted and has been fully observed in continuity, ever since the first publication was released. Hence, in studying and considering works which use precise terminology, we must go through the process of reexamination and comparative method of terminology and its usage.

For Locke the evolution into general terms is a necessary turn that the use of words and language had to take in order to maximize the cognitive potential and not harden it with unnecessary memorization of countless particularities, for which the ‘expressive brain modules’ would not have a need to generate expressive and thinking processes. In this way, the generalization of terms became a boost to the development of creative processes in the mind, and by that, helped their communication to the outside world and to future exchanges. It also enabled the faster evolution of human brain capacities in thinking consciously, and by this, to separate the animalistic ‘action’ instinct with the human mentation process.

As mentioned above (III.2.2), Locke’s conceptions are in certain ways in touch with Wilhelm von Humboldt’s ideas, especially concerning the ‘socially agreeable’ character of language as being the common ‘spirit of the nation’, where in order for people to be able to be understood, they have to decide on some sort of agreeable ‘terminology’, nevertheless retaining their original ideas specific only to them and unable to be met by anyone outside, even if the idea is based on sensory perceptible objects and things. (Humboldt) In Locke’s observations, the sensible experience is crucial in signifying things, ideas, experiences, and determines the later meaning-making out of terms. However, in both authors this agreement appears to happen randomly, in a natural way, and as a part of the language evolution. (Locke; Humboldt)

The arbitrariness of sounds appointed to certain ideas – as noted from the use of the term in Locke’s epoch – apparently seems to be a suggestion of decisive choice, rather than a random order of utterance, and as such it is again acting as a symbolical representation of ideas in a specific culture – whatever the stage of its intellectual evolution might have been (III.2.1). Although a similar term is central in Saussure’s theory of arbitrary character of the “sound image” in signifying the “concept”, the different designation of the term is evident. In Locke’s employment of the term, the meaning is a decision, while Saussure suggests it having the connotation of randomness and being unmotivated (Saussure; Locke). This symbolism means that the decision on both particular and general terms is the result of a constant effort to communicate, and as such, it was bound to the social influence on the evolution of language. Moreover, perhaps, the evolution of humanity reached a stage where the naming was seen as an attribute of particular character of people (Cratylos 390).

The search for the origin of language and words remains a mystery, as Humboldt would suggest and as Locke indirectly points too – by simply avoiding addressing it, as something unattainable. It is a seemingly undeniable fact that individual perception is decisive in the ability of having a fixed general terms and words for ideas and things. Through this, humanity and language pose as two fundamental factors destined to be the intermediary conceptualization between the individual and the outer world, and as such to constitute the compromise required for the purpose of communication. But as noted previously, this ‘intermediarity’ is a reproducing phenomenon that evolves in parallel with societal and cultural evolution, consequently affecting the individual too. Perhaps it is this that Locke refers to when he points out that “the use of words before the knowledge about their signification is fully perceived” (III.2.7). For a good amount of words, we use them before pointing a certain idea to it in our head, and only later we come to some realization of what that particular sound and term has already been building a signification on. It appears as a psychic function in our sub-consciousness, related to how the repetitive usage of words is able to reproduce a certain signification in the mind, and which, at times, is the primal cause of deviation and symbolical usage of terms, derived from sense-perceptible objects (III.1.5).

The interpretation of Locke’s ideas on words and language is vast, but it is crucial to note that they focus on exposing their chief end usage as a tool for signification in one’s mind and as tool of making possible the communication with the outer world. In these first chapters of the Third Book, Locke is not concerned with the reasons of why and how these attributes came to take place – perhaps out of the impossibility of having any certain reference to their appearance – instead focuses on observing them as readymade unchangeable realities that need to be understood in order for humanity to further improve the efficiency of their usage. Nevertheless, their main purpose remains the role of serving as a tool for processing both inner cognitive processes, as well as serving as a communication medium. This is Locke’s genuine attempt to clarify and define the bases of word production and how they are adapted into a language usage, offering thus a solid ground for further investigations and research.

Works Cited

Locke, John: “Book III – Of Words”. An Essay concerning Human understanding. 1690. Ch. I-III.7.

von Humboldt, Wilhelm: “Nature and Constitution of Language”. On language: On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and its Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species, Cambridge 1999.

von Humboldt, Wilhelm: “Individuals and Nations”. On language: On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and I ts Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species, Cambridge 1999.

von Humboldt, Wilhelm: “Closer Consideration of Language”. On language: On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and I ts Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species, Cambridge 1999.

de Saussure, Ferdinand: “Immutability and Mutability of the Sign”. Course in General Linguistics. New York 2011, Part I, ch. 2, pp. 65-78.

Plato: Cratylos. Trans. C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett. 1998.

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